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The Transparent Self under Big Data Profiling:  
Privacy and Chinese Legislation on the Social Credit System 
 
Yongxi Chen* and Anne SY Cheung** 
 
Big data is one of the buzz phrases of the 21st century, concerning not only the 
digitalisation of data on billions of individuals, but also what those in power are able 
to do with that data. The defining characteristic of big data is the capacity to search, 
aggregate and cross-reference large datasets for analysis to identify previously 
undetectable patterns,1 as well as the power to profile individuals, calculate risks, and 
monitor and even predict behaviour.2 When big data is harvested by governments, the 
worry is that the totality of individuals’ lives will be captured, that citizens will be 
monitored and that the Orwellian state will become a reality.  
In China, such a worry seems far from unfounded given the Chinese 
Communist Party’s (CCP) roll-out of its powerful Social Credit System (SCS). 
Launched at the national level in 2014, the system’s aim is to assess the 
trustworthiness of Chinese citizens in keeping their promises and complying with 
legal rules, moral norms, and professional and ethical standards.3 It is essentially an 
                                                          
* Postdoctoral Fellow, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong. 
** Professor, Faculty of Law, The University of Hong Kong. 
1 Danah boyd and Kate Crawford, “Critical Questions for Big Data,” Information, Communication & 
Society 15, no. 5 (2012): 662–79. 
2 “Big Data: Big Power Shifts?,” Alexander von Humboldt Institut Für Internet Und Gesellschaft, 
accessed January 18, 2017, http://www.hiig.de/big-data-big-power-shifts/. 
3 See Planning Outline for the Construction of the Social Credit System (2014-2020) [社会信用体系建
设规划纲要（2014—2020年）] (adopted by St. Council and effective on June 14, 2014) (SCS 
Outline hereafter). For the public concerns related to the social credit system, see    
Charles Clover, “China: When Big Data Meets Big Brother,” Financial Times, 20 January 2016 at 
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all-encompassing, penetrative system of personal data processing, manifested by the 
comprehensive collection and expansive use of personal data with the explicit 
intention on the Chinese government’s part of harnessing the ambition and power of 
big data technology.4 The SCS rates both business entities and individuals. According 
to its blueprint, the records that are collected can be extensively used by the 
authorities and business entities alike for a variety of purposes broadly related to 
‘encouraging trustworthiness and punishing untrustworthiness’.5 
Whilst the use of big data analytics in the context of credit scoring and the 
rating of individuals is not unique to China, in other jurisdictions it is usually confined 
to the financial arena and regulated by law.6 What differentiates China is the scale of 
the data collected, the scope of its use and, particularly important for the purposes of 
this article, the apparent lack of a comprehensive legal system to protect personal data. 
Despite the introduction of the Cyber Security Law in 2016 in relation to online data,7 
the extension of civil law protection to consumer data in 2013, and the criminalisation 
of the unlawful gathering, receipt and sale of personal data in 2009, personal data as a 
general subject has yet to be clearly defined and effectively protected under Chinese 
                                                                                                                                                                      
https://next.ft.com/content/b5b13a5e-b847-11e5-b151-8e15c9a029fb. 
4 One year following the issuance of SCS Outline, the State Council adopted an outline for big data 
development in which the Social Credit System is a stressed field for the application of big data 
technology. See Action Outline for Big Data Development [促进大数据发展行动纲要] (adopted by St. 
Council and effective on Aug. 31, 2015) (Big Data Outline hereafter).  
5Guidelines of the State Council on Establishing and Improving the System of Joint Rewarding for 
Trustworthiness and Joint Punishment for Untrustworthiness and Accelerating the Construction of 
Trustworthiness in the Society [国务院关于建立完善守信联合激励和失信联合惩戒制度加快推进
社会诚信建设的指导意见] (issued by the St. Council on May 30, 2016). “Notice of the National 
Development and Reform Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, the People’s Bank of China, and 
Other Departments on Issuing the Memorandum of Understanding on Taking Joint Disciplinary 
Actions against Untrustworthy Persons Subject to Enforcement,” January 20, 2016. 
6 See for example the case of the US and the EU: US Federal Trade Commission, Big Data: A Tool for 
Inclusion or Exclusion? Understanding the Issues, (2016); US White House, “Big Data: A Report on 
Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity and Civil Rights,” 2016. Article 4 of the EU General Data 
Protection Regulation (2018) regulates the use of automated processing of personal data for profiling.  
7 Cyber Security Law [网络安全法] (adopted by Nat'l People's Cong., Nov. 7, 2016, effective June 1, 
2017). 
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law.8 The rights that data subjects are entitled to under a personal data protection 
regime are rarely mentioned in China and are, at best, provided for under scattered 
sector-specific laws.9  
Given the inadequate protection afforded personal data in China, the country is 
an ideal social laboratory for big data experimentation, data intelligence and mass 
surveillance. Individuals risk being reduced to transparent selves before the state in 
this uneven battle.10 They are uncertain about what contributes to their social credit 
scores, how those scores are combined with the state system, and how their data is 
interpreted and used. In short, the big data-driven SCS is confronting Chinese citizens 
with major challenges to their privacy and personal data.  
Although the State Council’s Planning Outline for the Construction of the 
Social Credit System (SCS Outline hereafter) sketches out an ambitious blueprint, it is 
the pilot legislation implemented at the local level since 2014 that has institutionalised 
the collection and use of social credit-related data. To analyse China’s emerging SCS 
under existing international legal principles concerning personal data protection,11 this 
article identifies and compares typical examples of relevant legislation at the local 
level and discusses their implications for personal data protection. It argues that 
                                                          
8 Article 253, Criminal Law [刑法] (adopted by Nat'l People's Cong. on July 1, 1979, amended March 
14, 1997, effective July 1, 1997), amended by Amendment to the Criminal Law (VII) [刑法修正案
（七）] (adopted by Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. and effective on February 28, 2009). Art. 
29, Consumer Rights and Interests Protection Law [消费者权益保护法] (promulgated on Oct. 31, 
1993, amended Oct. 15, 2013, effective March 15, 2014). Neither of the laws define personal data. 
9 The personal data principles in the OECD guideline. “OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy 
and Transborder Flows of Personal Data - OECD,” accessed May 26, 2016, 
http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofperso
naldata.htm#theproblems. 
10 David Brin, The Transparent Society: Will Technology Force Us To Choose Between Privacy And 
Freedom? (Basic Books, 1999). Brin mentions in his book that technology will bring towards a 
transparent society. Here we argue that only the powerless individuals have become transparent but the 
state and commercial conglomerates have remained opaque. 
11 OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal 
Datahttp://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofp
ersonaldata.htm. 
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existing legislation and proposed regulations require substantial revisions to mitigate 
the impacts of the SCS on data privacy and other interests critical to individual 
citizens. 
The article begins by mapping out the background to the construction of 
China’s big data social laboratory and the SCS. Section 1 examines the system’s 
social management aim and comprehensive sanction system, as well as its nature as a 
collaborative project between the authorities and the business sector. Section 2 then 
summarises the legislative history and evolving concept of social credit and analyses 
the nature of individuals’ rights to personal data protection under China’s 
uncoordinated legal framework. The third section of the article reviews local social 
credit legislation with reference to the three cardinal principles of personal data 
protection most closely related to data subjects’ control over the processing of their 
data: (1) the data collection principle,12 (2) the data usage principle,13 and (3) data 
subjects’ right to access and correct their own data.14 The final section concludes that 
although local legislation provides nominal rights of access to and a few restrictions 
on the collection and use of data, it has largely failed to secure meaningful control 
over personal data for individuals. These legislative defects relate to the very purpose 
of the SCS and to extra-legal restrictions inherited from the pre-reform party-state 
regime. As the term ‘personal information’ is used in Chinese legislative enactments 
and policy documents, ‘data’ and ‘information’ are used interchangeably throughout 
the article. 
                                                          
12 OECD Guideline, Collection Limitation Principle stipulates that “the collection of personal data 
should be by lawful and fair means and, where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of the data 
subjects.”  
13  OECD Guideline, Use Limitation Principle stipulates that “personal data should not be disclosed, 
made available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified [at the time of collection] 
except with the consent of the data subject; or by the authority of law.” 
14 This is governed under OECD Guideline, Individual Participation Principle. 
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THE UNFOLDING SOCIAL CREDIT SYSTEM 
The stated vision of the SCS rolled out in 2014 is to foster trustworthiness in 
society, enhance market efficiency, strengthen social governance and build a 
harmonious society within the socialist state. 15  Whilst that may sound like CCP 
rhetoric, the distinctive, and most controversial, feature of the SCS is its rating of the 
trustworthiness of each and every business entity and citizen. According to the SCS 
Outline, the authorities can use financial, law enforcement, and other data to evaluate 
all enterprises and citizens and hold them accountable for any misbehaviour.16 The 
goal is to build a comprehensive, nationwide platform aggregating all related data by 
2020. Accordingly, every citizen’s/business entity’s scores in the political-
administrative, commercial, social and judicial arenas will be compiled.17  
The idea of ‘social credit’ was originally introduced in the early 2000s to steer 
economic reforms that increase the financial creditworthiness (信用) of businesses 
and individuals. 18  It gradually expanded to encompass their integrity or 
trustworthiness (诚信) with respect to fulfilling contractual and legal commitments.19 
Since 2011, CCP directives and central government policies have used ‘social credit’ 
as a comprehensive concept that is closely related to both market regulation and social 
                                                          
15 SCS Outline, supra note 3, Introduction. 
16 Ibid, Parts I & II; see also Michelle Florcruz, “China To Use Big Data To Rate Citizens In New 
‘Social Credit System,’” International Business Times, April 28, 2015, http://www.ibtimes.com/china-
use-big-data-rate-citizens-new-social-credit-system-1898711. 
17 SCS Outline, supra note 3, Introduction, para. 3. 
18 For the evolution of the understanding of social credit in national policies, see Xiaoyuan Liu [刘肖原] 
et al, On Constructing the Social Credit System in China [我国社会信用体系建设研究] (Intellectual 
Property Press [知识产权出版社], 2016) 85-91. For an account of the historical development of social 
credit system in national policies from 2003 to 2011, see Yue Liu et al., “An Overview of Big Data 
Industry in China,” China Communications, December 2014, 2. 
19 See Yancun Lei [类延村], “Beyond the Rule of Law: Rule-based Regulation under the Social 
Trustworthiness System” [超越法治：社会诚信体系的规则治理], Journal of Central South 
University (Social Science Edition) [中南大学学报（社会科学版）], No.4, 2014, 65-72. Lei and 
other scholars object confounding the “social credit system (understood by them as essentially a 
financial credit system) with the “social trustworthiness system” (社会诚信体系). Nevertheless, 
“social credit system” is now predominantly used in both official and academic discourses to denote 
the comprehensive networked system of behaviour rating and responsibility placing.   
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governance.20 In addition, governments at the local level have harboured the idea of 
building a multidimensional social credit system to restore trust in society.21 In 2010, 
Suining County in Jiangsu Province (north of Shanghai) launched a pilot programme 
that awarded points for good behaviour and deducted points for bad behaviour such as 
traffic violations and illegally petitioning the higher authorities for help.22 Rewards 
included the fast-tracking of promotions at work or of public housing applications. 
Although the programme was heavily criticised,23 it provided an early glimpse of a 
social scoring system. Another attempt at a social credit system was made by the 
Shanghai municipal government, which published a catalogue of more than 1200 
items that would be awarded points for entry into a credit system.24 About 1000 of the 
items related to business entities, with the remainder concerning individual citizens. 
In 2016, the Shanghai government suggested that filial piety be entered into the 
scoring system, assessed, for example, by the frequency with which an individual 
visited his or her parents and by whether an individual’s parents had enough food.25 
Regardless of the controversy surrounding such suggestions, more than 35 local 
governments across the country had joined the SCS by 2016, gathering digital records 
on the social and financial behaviour of their citizens.26 Two outstanding questions 
remain: Where does all of this data come from, and what happens to those with a low 
social credit score? 
                                                          
20 Liu, note supra 18, 88.  
21 Yue Liu et al, note supra 18, 4. 
22 “Creating a Digital Totalitarian State,” The Economist, December 17, 2016, 20. 
23 According to the Economist, it was criticized by China Youth Daily and Beijing Times. 
24 “R&D on Credit Scoring Facilitates Accurate Governance in Shanghai” [上海研发信用分助精准施
政], Wenhui News [文汇报], 4 August 2016, p 3. See also Rogier Creemers et al., “What Could China’s 
‘Social Credit System’ Mean for Its Citizens?,” Foreign Policy, August 15, 2016, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/08/15/what-could-chinas-social-credit-system-mean-for-its-citizens/. 
25 Josh Chin, “China’s New Tool for Social Control: A Credit Rating for Everything,” Wall Street 
Journal, November 28, 2016, sec. World, http://www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-new-tool-for-social-
control-a-credit-rating-for-everything-1480351590. 
26 Ibid. 
7 
 
Big Data: Where Does all the Data Come from? 
Although government officials can easily retrieve such information as court 
records and health, loan and tax data from state departments, that information is 
insufficient to generate a comprehensive profile of individuals. To do so, the 
government has to capture their nonfinancial activities. Eyeing the capture of more 
extensive Internet data that can reveal a person’s social media use, online shopping 
activity and everyday habits, the central authorities are keen to utilise big data 
technology. Big data sources include administrative, transactional, sensor, tracking, 
behavioural and opinion data.27 In 2016, as part of the 13th five-year plan (2016-
2020), the CCP announced that the SCS would go hand in hand with a series of social 
and economic initiatives utilising big data technology, including a national big data 
strategy focusing on the opening up and sharing of data resources.28 In other words, 
the SCS is intertwined with both government and society-generated big data 
applications, both online and offline. As noted, China provides an ideal big data and 
social laboratory. It has 1.3 billion citizens, and had 731 million Internet users by the 
end of June 2016, for a penetration rate of 53.2%.29 Equally impressive is China’s 
more than 695 million mobile phone users, nearly a quarter of whom use their mobile 
phones only to go online.30 Furthermore, the authorities are armed with a real name 
                                                          
27 Administrative data include electronic medical, insurance, bank and school records; transactional 
data include credit card and online transactions; sensor data include satellite imaging, climate sensors 
and air pollution measurement devices; tracking devices include GPS and tracking data from mobile 
phones; behavioural data include online searches; and opinion data include comments on social media. 
Jackie Hoi Wai Cheng, “Big Data for Development in China” (UNDP China Working Paper, November 
2014), 3, 
http://www.cn.undp.org/content/dam/china/docs/Publications/UNDP%20Working%20Paper_Big%20D
ata%20for%20Development%20in%20China_Nov%202014.pdf. 
28 Outline of the 13th Five-Year Plan for the National Economic and Social Development of the PRC 
[中华人民共和国国民经济和社会发展第十三个五年规划纲要] (approved by Nat'l People's Cong., 
March 16, 2016). 
29 “No. 39 Statistical Report on China Internet Network Development” [第 39次中国互联网络发展状
况统计] China Internet Network Information Center, January 2017, 33. 
30 “No. 38 Statistical Report on China Internet Network Development” 第 38次中国互联网络发展状
况统计 [] China Internet Network Information Center, August 2016, 12. 
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registration system that records the users of telecommunications services in China,31 
and such data can be easily and accurately matched with users’ identities.  
Partnerships 
The authorities are partnering with various Internet titans and private entities to 
unlock the power of big data. As early as 2014, China boasted more than 50% of the 
world’s big data enterprises32 specialising in the collection, aggregation, analysis and 
mining of data, the building of cross-platform infrastructure, and the design of various 
big data applications.33 In 2013, China’s National Bureau of Statistics signed a series 
of agreements with 11 major Chinese companies for long-term collaboration on the 
use of big data,34 including Baidu, Alibaba and China Unicom.35 The country’s three 
Internet giants have all tapped into the big data market. Baidu, the Chinese equivalent 
of Google’s search engine, for example, operates its own Big Data Lab in Beijing,36 
which has developed predictive programmes for disease monitoring. 37  Alibaba, 
China’s largest e-commerce company, makes use of a wealth of financial information 
gleaned from its Taobao and Alipay programmes to determine which businesses are 
worthy of loans.38 Tencent, the tech mobile giant that runs WeChat, is using social 
data to identify the trendsetters within social groups to target them in marketing so as 
to influence the spending habits of the other members of those groups.39 What is 
                                                          
31 National People's Congress Standing Committee Decision Concerning Strengthening Network 
Information Protection [全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于加强网络信息保护的决定] (adopted by 
Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong. on 28 December 2012, effective 28 December 2012). 
32 Liu et al., “An Overview of Big Data Industry in China,” 4.  
33 Ibid. 
34 National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Big Data and Official Statistics in China: Working Paper,” 
2014, http://www.unescap.org/sites/default/files/1-
Big%20Data%20and%20Official%20Statistics%20in%20China.pdf. 
35 Cheng, “Big Data for Development in China,” 9. 
36 Ana Swanson, “The Power of Big Data in China,” CKGSB Knowledge, 26 July 2015 at 
http://knowledge.ckgsb.edu.cn/2015/07/28/technology/the-power-of-big-data-in-china/ 
37 Ibid. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid. 
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potentially worrying is that these companies share data with the government for the 
SCS.40  
China’s central bank once considered issuing licences to such companies as 
Tencent, Alibaba and Ping An Insurance to develop experimental credit ratings for 
use in assessing applicants for small business loans or consumer credit. 41  In 
determining whether applicants are creditworthy, these companies rely on such non-
traditional indicators as Internet search histories, mobile phone purchases and social 
media activity. By 2015, Tencent alone had rated the creditworthiness of 50 million 
Chinese consumers using social networking and computer gaming data.42 
Beyond the lending and borrowing arena, Alibaba introduced Sesame Credit in 
2015 as an internal rating system based on the spending habits of Alipay users.43 
Credit scores range from 350 to 950 points, with users scoring above 600 considered 
to be creditworthy.44 What is worrying is that individuals’ credit scores are based not 
only on their own lending and spending habits but also on what the money in question 
is going towards and also on the lending and spending habits of their friends.45 
Although it is unclear whether the Sesame Credit scoring system accurately predicts 
credit defaults, the system’s impact is clearly being felt in the daily lives of Chinese 
citizens. For example, individuals’ Sesame score affects the level of screening they 
                                                          
40 See SCS Outline. For the public concerns raised by this system, see    
Charles Clover, “China: When Big Data Meets Big Brother,” Financial Times, January 20, 2016, 
https://www.ft.com/content/b5b13a5e-b847-11e5-b151-8e15c9a029fb. 
41 “The Central Bank Instructs Eight Entities to Prepare for the Service of Credit Investigation 
Pertaining to Individuals” [央行要求八家机构做好个人征信业务准备工作], (5 January 2015), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/bank/bank_hydt/20150105/172921227406.shtml. Two years later, the 
central bank nevertheless decided not to issue the licenses in view of the abuse in some applicants’ 
collection and use of personal credit information among other regulatory concerns. See “Credit 
Investigations Pertaining to Individuals Should be Subject to Regulation Before Sliding into Chaos” 
[个人征信不可先乱后治], Caixin Weekly [财新周刊], 1 May 2017.  
42 Charles Clover, “China P2P Lender Banks on Social Media Usage,” Financial Times, August 30, 
2015, https://www.ft.com/content/673d9608-4d83-11e5-b558-8a9722977189. 
43 Florcruz, “China To Use Big Data To Rate Citizens In New ‘Social Credit System.’” 
44 Ibid. 
45 Clover, “China: When Big Data Meets Big Brother.” 
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are subjected to at airport security,46 the insurance premium they have to pay,47 their 
chances of adopting a pet from an animal shelter48 and even their placement on online 
dating services. 49  Although some citizens enjoy the convenience offered by the 
Sesame Credit scoring system,50 the other side of the coin is that many can ill afford 
to remain outside the system regardless of what they think of it. Furthermore, benefits 
and convenience to some mean sanctions and exclusion for others. 
Sanctions 
Despite the extensive reach of the Sesame scoring system, it is voluntary in 
nature. The national SCS, in contrast, is mandatory, and the possible sanctions against 
the untrustworthy are wide-ranging.51 For example, a low social credit rating can 
affect one’s ability to travel, with reports suggesting that judgment defaulters (i.e. 
those defying a court order) had been blocked from buying an airline ticket on 
approximately 5 million occasions as of August 2016.52  This type of sanction is 
commonly used by the courts against judgment defaulters, with such individuals also 
stopped from travelling on high-speed trains.53 There are also reputational sanctions, 
with information on untrustworthy persons or businesses disclosed on the national 
Credit China website54 or similar provincial websites and on major news websites.55 
Furthermore, a poor SCS score can also diminish one’s employment prospects, with 
those deemed untrustworthy being barred from the civil service and employment in 
                                                          
46 Since September 2015, Beijing International Airport has offered fast security screening to Sesame 
Credit customers with credit scores of 750 or above. Luxembourg and Singapore airport are believed to 
soon follow suit. Ibid. 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Celia Hatton, “China ‘Social Credit’: Beijing Sets up Huge System,” BBC News, October 26, 2015, 
sec. China, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186. 
50 Ibid. 
51 “No. 141 [2016] of the National Development and Reform Commission.” 
52 “Creating a Digital Totalitarian State,” 22. 
53 Ibid, para. 19. 
54 Supra note 51, para. 15. Credit China website is at http://www.creditchina.gov.cn 
55 Ibid, para. 16. 
11 
 
public institutions.56 Even worse, not only are the untrustworthy themselves punished, 
but the education of their children is affected, as the latter are disqualified from 
studying in private schools.57 
At the time of writing, both the official SCS and private credit scoring systems 
such as the aforementioned Sesame system are only just beginning to flex their 
muscles. Many pieces of information on the SCS, which seems to have been hatched 
by a dystopian imagination, remain missing from the literature. Despite publication of 
the SCS Outline and its implementing documents, a great deal of obscurity surrounds 
the issues of the types of data likely to enter the system and the possible sanctions it 
entails. In addition, the extent of the data sharing between the state and private sector 
remains unknown, 58  and it is also unclear how data is being used, whether any 
algorithm is involved in ratings and what can be done about inaccurate data. Now is 
thus an opportune time to survey the pilot legislation emerging in various regions of 
the country to make sense of the national framework. The adequacy of such 
legislation for protecting personal data privacy is an important starting point for an 
inquiry into ways of addressing the various challenges the SCS poses to the 
fundamental interests of individuals.  
EVOLVING LEGISLATION ON CREDIT DATA 
Corresponding to the changing concept of social credit, legislation regulating 
social credit data has evolved along with, and sometimes despite, the uncoordinated 
legal framework governing the processing of various kinds of personal data held by 
                                                          
56 Ibid, para. 17. 
57 Ibid, para. 22. 
58 In 2016, Jack Ma, the co-founder and CEO of Alibaba Group Holding LTD encouraged 1.5 million 
political and legal officials to embrace internet data in their fight against crime and terrorism in a public 
speech. This raises concerns about whether data held by Internet companies would be shared easily 
with the authorities. Jie Yang and Alyssa Abkowitz, “Alibaba’s Jack Ma Supports Internet Data Use in 
Fighting Crime,” Wall Street Journal, October 25, 2016, sec. Tech, 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/alibabas-jack-ma-supports-internet-data-use-in-fighting-crime-
1477314916. 
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various authorities. The distinction between public law and private law bears heavily 
on China’s personal data protection regime. That distinction is of even greater 
importance under the SCS, which encourages the flow of big data on individuals 
amongst public authorities and private entities.  
Before the introduction of the comprehensive SCS, the central authorities 
promoted a credit investigation system (征信系统) as a pioneering project to improve 
the credit environment of the market and encourage sincerity amongst business 
entities and individuals. 59  Individuals’ rights with respect to the collection and 
processing of their own financial credit information (FCI) were gradually recognised. 
Those rights were provided primarily under the administrative rules issued by the 
People’s Bank of China in 200560 and subsequently under the 2013 Regulation on the 
Administration of The Credit Investigation Industry (RACII). 61  The regulatory 
approach within RACII is inspired to some degree by the US Fair Credit Reporting 
Act.62 Insofar as the credit investigation institutions and entities providing credit data 
(e.g. commercial banks) are both private bodies, individuals enjoy civil rights with 
regard to the protection of personal credit information. Such rights include, among 
                                                          
59 Although the State Council put forward the idea of social credit system in 2007, it placed the policy 
thrust of the time at building a system of financial credit investigation. See Several Opinions on the 
Construction of the Social Credit System [国务院办公厅关于社会信用体系建设的若干意见, issued 
by the General Office of State Council on March 23, 2007, Part I. Cf. SCS Outline of 2014, Part I, 
Sections (1) and (2). 
60 The most comprehensive rule is the Interim Measures on the Basic Databases of Personal Credit 
Information [个人信用信息基础数据库管理暂行办法] (issued by the People’s Central Bank of China 
on Aug. 18, 2005, effective Oct. 1, 2005). 
61 Regulation on the Administration of Credit Investigation Industry [征信业管理条例]. This 
regulation uses the term “personal credit information” to refer to personal information on loans and 
transactions and other information that may reflect an individual’s credit situation. 
62 See Zhiwei Su [苏志伟] et al., Development Model and Practice of the Credit Investigation Systems 
in Major Jurisdictions: Reflections on Building the Credit Investigation System in China [世界主要国
家和地区征信体系发展模式与实践：对中国征信体系建设的反思] (Economic Science Press [经济
科学出版社], 2014). 
13 
 
others, consent must be sought of the use of one’s credit records and individuals have 
a right to access and rectify those records.63  
However, with the central authorities’ moves to construct the SCS that we see 
today, more complicated issues have arisen over the nature and scope of the rights 
pertaining to personal credit records. As specified in the SCS Outline, government 
agencies collect — and put to various uses — ‘social credit information’, and such 
information extends beyond the credit records used in economic transactions to 
encompass a great variety of records pertaining to compliance with laws, 
administrative norms, moral standards and contractual terms. The rights of individuals 
concerning this broader range of credit data held by government agencies belong to 
the realm of public law, and their legal basis must be sought from laws other than the 
aforementioned RACII. The legislative and administrative enactments concerning 
social credit data resulting from local pilot schemes and the Regulation on Open 
Government Information (ROGI) have become the most important sources of law on 
information rights. 
Furthermore, a number of regions began experimenting with the construction of 
social credit systems in the late 2000s, and introduced pioneering local legislation on 
the collection and use of social credit data, including both local regulations and 
administrative rules.64 Such regulations and rules generally use the term ‘public credit 
information’ (公共信用信息, PCI) to refer to information indicating an individual’s 
                                                          
63 Arts 17 & 25, RACII. 
64 Local regulations made by People’s Congresses at the provincial or prefectural level and capable of 
creating actionable rights. Administrative rules are enactments made by provincial and prefectural 
governments that have general binding effect. See for example Shaanxi Provincial Regulation on 
Public Credit Information [陕西省公共信用信息条例], (promulgated by Shaanxi Provincial People’s 
Congress on Nov. 1, 2011). Administrative rule is a source of law but is not capable of creating 
actionable rights. See for example Interim Measures of Hangzhou City on the Collection and Use of 
Public Credit Information [杭州市公共信用信息归集和使用暂行办法], (issued by the Hangzhou 
City Government on Oct. 1, 2009). 
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trustworthiness that is generated or collected by the authorities in the course of 
exercising their public powers (i.e. government agencies, judicial authorities, organs 
that exercise administrative power under the authorisation of laws and regulations) or 
by public service providers. PCI is thus distinct from FCI, which is processed by 
credit investigation bodies, and is in essence equivalent to ‘social credit information’ 
referred to in the SCS Outline. This article uses PCI to refer to credit information 
regulated by local enactments.   
After promulgation of the national SCS Outline, local legislation accelerated in 
the developed coastal cities of China. Most focuses on elaborating the categories of 
PCI subject to sharing amongst government agencies and the purposes for which such 
information can be used, as well as the rights of ‘information subjects’ to processed 
information.65 The following sections of the article review typical examples of local 
legislation enacted since 2014. 
COLLECTION OF CREDIT DATA 
Local legislation invariably allows the extensive collection and use of PCI, a 
situation that derives from the holistic approach adopted by the SCS to curtail 
rampant fraud in economic transactions and evasions of basic social obligations. This 
holistic approach focuses on introducing incentive schemes for ‘faith keeping’ across 
                                                          
65 Typical local regulations include Regulation of Wuxi City on Public Credit Information [无锡市公
共信用信息条例] (promulgated by Wuxi City People’s Congress on Dec. 4, 2015) (“Wuxi 
Regulation” hereafter); Hubei Provincial Social Credit Information [湖北省社会信用信息管理条例] 
(promulgated by Hubei Provincial People’s Congress on May 30, 2017, effective July 1, 2017) (“Hubei 
Regulation” hereafter). 
Typical local administrative rules include: Shanghai Municipal Provisions on the Collection and Use of 
Public Credit Information [上海市公共信用信息归集和使用管理办法] (issued by Shanghai 
Municipal Government on Dec. 30, 2015) (“Shanghai Rules” hereafter); Provisions of Wuhan City on 
Public Credit Information [武汉市公共信用信息管理办法] (issued by Wuhan City Government on 
July 20, 2016) (“Wuhan Rules” hereafter); Provisions of Hangzhou City on Public Credit Information 
[杭州市公共信用信息管理办法] (issued by Hangzhou City Government on Aug. 28, 2016) 
(“Hangzhou Rules” hereafter). 
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government departments, industries and societal sectors. The most prominent such 
scheme is a joint punishment/reward mechanism that amplifies the consequences of 
particular behaviour beyond the original context into other spheres of the wrongdoer’s 
life, thereby markedly raising the cost of misbehaviour. The system relies not only on 
a combination of mechanisms implemented by state agencies, market participants, and 
individuals, but also on the smooth flow of credit records, i.e. on the sharing of 
knowledge about the behaviour concerned amongst those 
agencies/participants/individuals. Although the collection and use of credit records 
serve the general purpose of credit-based decision-making, that purpose is highly 
malleable and may differ from the purposes for which those records were originally 
generated by a particular government department or collected from a particular entity 
of an industry or a sector. As revealed by the analysis below, purpose limitation as an 
essential component of data protection is largely ineffective under the policy 
documents and local legislation on social credit. 
SCS operation begins with the collection of social credit records by the agencies 
in charge of social credit (‘SC authorities’ hereafter). The major form of collection is 
transferring the records that are generated by various responsible agencies to 
dedicated information systems at given levels (‘PCI platforms’ hereafter). The scope 
and categories of the collected records, a considerable portion of which is personal 
information,66  are determined by local governments rather than local legislatures, 
primarily by SC authorities.67 Following the RACII approach, local PCI legislation 
forbids the collection of certain sensitive personal information, including genetic data, 
                                                          
66 Another part of information is records concerning enterprises which are regulated by a special system 
of enterprise. 
67 The reform and development department, one of the most powerful government branches, is usually 
designated as the SC authority at local levels. See Wuxi Regulation, Wuhan Rules, and Hangzhou 
Rules. Hubei Regulation requires the provincial government to approve the collection scope. 
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blood types, fingerprints, and information on diseases and religious beliefs.68 Unlike 
the collection of FCI under RACII, however, government agencies do not need to 
obtain the consent of data subjects to collect PCI, nor do they need to satisfy any 
purpose limitation rule.69 In addition, most local legislation does not vest individuals 
with the right to be notified about the transfer of discrediting records from agencies to 
PCI platforms.70 
Under current local legislation, PCI generally consists of two major categories: 
(1) identity information on individuals, e.g. ID numbers or social security registration, 
and (2) credit records generated or acquired by government agencies in the exercise of 
their administrative powers or in the course of providing public services.71 Credit 
records encompass both positive assessments received by an individual (e.g. 
recognition and rewards) and ‘discrediting information’, e.g. information on the 
violation of or failure to comply with legal, contractual or even ethical requirements. 
The common types of misbehaviour logged in discrediting information correspond to 
those prescribed under the SCS Outline, including tax evasion, the non-payment of 
administrative fees, failure to perform the obligations prescribed in court judgments, 
being subject to administrative penalties or coercive measures, being held liable for 
accidents that affect public, food or work safety or environmental protection, being 
prohibited by the regulatory authorities from entering certain industries, and fraud in 
business transactions, state-held exams or social security applications. Disruptive 
                                                          
68 Cf. Art. 14, RACII. 
69 Article 13 of the RACII stipulate that collection of personal information should obtain the consent of 
the subject of the information, unless for information which should be disclosed pursuant to or 
administrative regulations. 
70 The only exception is the most recent Hubei Regulation. See Art. 23. The same article provides 
nevertheless that laws and other regulations can mandate the transfer without notifying the information 
subjects. In contrast, Article 15 of the RACII stipulates that provision of bad [financial] credit 
information about an individual to a credit investigation institution should be conducted only after the 
individual concerned is informed, except for information that is disclosed pursuant to laws and 
regulations. 
71 These two categories are common to all local legislation and normative documents on SCI reviewed 
in this article.  
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behaviour in the course of using public services is also included. Such behaviour 
common in China includes ticket evasion on public transport and disturbances in 
hospitals by patients dissatisfied with medical treatment.   
In addition to agency-submitted records, the SC authorities in some regions are 
allowed to gather records from non-state credit service providers, industry 
associations or the media. 72  They may also receive discrediting information on 
individuals from members of the public after confirmation with both the individuals 
concerned and the agency with jurisdiction over the activity in question. The SC 
authorities may then record that information in the PCI platforms.73 Compared with 
the credit records generated by government agencies following statutory procedures, 
those generated by other parties may be of questionable reliability. Possibly because 
of this concern, the most recent PCI legislation, Hubei Provincial Social Credit 
Information, imposes an obligation to seek consent for the collection of credit records 
from non-state organisations,74 although other legislation lacks any such obligation. 
The earlier experience of Shanghai demonstrated that the mere mention of a consent 
obligation in legislation fails to ensure that consent is indeed sought before the 
government extends PCI collection to any records it sees fit.75  
                                                          
72 Art. 16, Wuxi Regulation; Art. 15, Hubei Regulation. 
73 Art. 30, Hangzhou Rules. 
74 Art. 17, Hubei Regulation. 
75 Under an earlier local pilot scheme which combined FCI and PCI, Shanghai government had once 
stressed that collection of PCI generated by entities other than public authorities should be based on 
consent. See Art. 7, Shanghai Interim Provisions on the Investigation of Personal Credit [上海市个人
信用征信管理试行办法] (issued by the Shanghai Municipal Government on Dec. 28, 2003, effective 
Feb. 1, 2004). However, until the interim provisions were substituted for by the Shanghai Rules 2015, 
the Shanghai government had included into the PCI platform a great variety of non-government 
information without consent of the data subjects, such as vehicle renting records, overdue notices on 
books borrowed from municipal libraries, and payment logs for electricity. See “Shanghai Enters the 
Era of ‘Social Credit Management’” [上海迈入"社会信用管理"时代], Liberation Daily [解放日报], 
17 August 2008; “Credit Records Being Misunderstood” [被误读的信用记录], Spiritual Civilization 
News [精神文明报], 10 October 2014, p 1. 
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USE OF CREDIT DATA 
Breaking the geographical and jurisdictional barriers to PCI use is the major 
rationale for the SCS. The integration of PCI into unified platforms enables its 
exploitation by various parties, as called for by the SCS Outline. In addition, as a 
government information resource, massive PCI datasets in China are concurrently 
governed by the Action Outline for Big Data Development (‘Big Data Outline’ 
hereafter), which actively promotes the cross-departmental sharing of government 
data to enhance governance capacity and  opens data for social applications to 
facilitate a data-driven economy.76 Based on the two national policy frameworks, PCI 
users can be divided into three groups: government agencies, whose access to PCI is 
via inter-agency sharing; non-state entities providing credit services, whose access is 
via authorisation; and businesses and individuals, whose access is primarily via the 
SC authorities’ proactive publication of PCI.  
Inter-Agency Sharing 
Under local legislation, government agencies can access the credit records stored 
in local PCI platforms in the course of discharging their responsibilities.77 The Interim 
Measures on the Sharing of Government Information Resources, a policy document 
implementing the Big Data Outline, explicitly mandates the sharing of credit 
information within the overall government apparatus.78 The recent guidelines issued 
by the General Office of the State Council further emphasise the necessity of unified 
                                                          
76 See Big Data Outline (note 4 above). 
77 See for example Art.18, Hangzhou Rules; Art. 21, para. 1, Hubei Regulation. 
78 Art. 10(3), Interim Measures on the Sharing of Government Information Resources [政务信息资源
共享管理暂行办法] (issued by St. Council on Sep. 5, 2016). According to the Measures, information 
resources generated or collected by government agencies in the course of discharging their 
responsibilities should generally be subject to sharing with other agencies. Exempting information from 
sharing is only warranted by “laws, administrative regulations or policies made by the Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party or the State Council.”(Art. 10 (1)). In particular, 
“information resources concerning the same theme of economic and social development and generated 
by various agencies together” should be shared inter-departmentally through the sharing platforms at 
different levels. Credit information is a highlighted example of such resources. (Art.10 (3)). 
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standards for PCI collection, categorisation, and sharing and of enhancing the 
interconnection and interoperability of PCI platforms across the country.79 In addition, 
a comprehensive credit information sharing system is under construction on the basis 
of the national data exchange platform, which by December 2016 had aggregated PCI 
submitted by 37 departments of the State Council and government agencies from 31 
provincial-level regions.80  It is expected that in the near future most government 
agencies will be allowed to access all PCI generated or acquired by their counterparts 
across the country.   
Furthermore, government agencies are required to request and use PCI under 
prescribed circumstances, most of which relate to the joint punishment or reward 
scheme. The scheme mainly covers the exercise of regulatory powers (such as 
licensing and punishment), government procurement, the granting of financial 
subsidies and the management of civil servants.81 The scope of ‘mandatory PCI use’ 
is determined by local governments or their agencies. 82  Those agencies are thus 
allowed, and even encouraged, to perform the automatic matching of the personal 
information contained in various PCI databases for any purpose related to the exercise 
of their administrative powers. 
As in the case of PCI collection, local legislation does not confer individuals 
with the right to object to the inter-agency sharing of PCI, and neither does it provide 
                                                          
79 Part V, Section 1, Guiding Opinions on Strengthening the Construction of the System for Individual 
Integrity [关于加强个人诚信体系建设的指导意见] (issued by the General Office of St. Council on 
Dec. 23, 2016) (hereinafter Guidelines on Individual Integrity).  
80 Yuandian Credit [源点信用], “Annual Report on China’s Social Credit System Construction” [2016
中国社会信用体系全景报告], January 2017, p 7, at http://yuandiancredit.com/h-nd-1312-2_347.html; 
“Officials in the National Development and Reform Commission Receives Interview on The Action 
Outline for Big Data Development” [我委有关负责人就《促进大数据发展行动纲要》答记者问] 
(The SDPC’s Website, Sep. 25, 2015) http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/zcfb/jd/201509/t20150925_752279.html; 
The Big Data Outline set the target of installing a unified data exchange platform by 2018 to cover all 
government departments at the central level. See Part III, Section I(1) of the Outline.  
81 See for example Art. 18, Shanghai Rules; Art. 27, Wuxi Regulation; Art. 24, Hubei Regulation. 
82 Ibid. 
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any mechanism for an agency sharing PCI to set limits on the purposes for which 
other agencies can use that information, despite such limits being permitted in the 
Interim Measures on the Sharing of Government Information Resources.83 However, 
in an attempt to inhibit PCI abuses, some local legislation requires agencies and PCI 
platform operators to keep logs of the collection, alteration, and deletion of PCI and 
access to such information,84 whilst other such legislation instructs agencies to specify 
the procedures for authorising internal personnel access to PCI.85 
Use by Non-State Parties upon ‘Authorisation’ 
Compared with government agencies, non-state parties are subject to greater 
restrictions on their access to PCI. All current local legislation provides a general rule 
specifying that private parties should obtain authorisation from the individuals 
concerned before seeking access to PCI on them that has not been published by the 
government.86 Although that rule seemingly increases individuals’ degree of control 
over their PCI, its enforcement is challenged by the government’s strong inclination 
to facilitate the access of credit service providers.87  
Local legislation notably stresses that SC authorities should encourage and 
support credit service providers to access and use PCI in developing credit products,88 
                                                          
83 Article 14 of the Interim Measures provide that “the user shall only use the information obtained 
from the sharing platform for the performance of its functions according to the specified use purpose, 
[and] shall not directly or indirectly use the information for any other purpose.” 
84 See for example Art. 29, Wuxi Regulation. 
85 See for example Art. 19, Shanghai Rules; Arts. 19 & 33, Hangzhou Rules. 
86 Art.16, Shanghai Rules; Art. 23, Wuxi Regulation; Art. 21, Hangzhou Rules (which further requires 
written consent of information subjects); Art. 19, Hubei Regulation. The imposition of authorization by 
the subject of credit information may be inspired by the similar requirements under the financial credit 
investigation. See Art. 13, RACII. 
87 Credit service providers mainly refer to for-profit intermediary organizations that are engaged in 
credit investigation, credit rating, credit consulting and other credit-related service. See Zhejiang 
Provincial Interim Measures on Credit Service Organizations (issued by Zhejiang Provincial 
Commission for Development and Reform on Aug. 21, 2007). 
88 See Art. 25, Shanghai Rules; Art. 28, Wuxi Regulation; Art. 24, Wuhan Rules; Art. 20, Hangzhou 
Rules; Art. 25, Hubei Regulation. 
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echoing the provisions of both the SCS Outline89 and Big Data Outline.90 In some 
regions, SC authorities are instructed to afford credit service providers bulk access to 
the records held by PCI platforms if certain information security requirements are 
met.91 However, concerns may be raised about whether those authorities sometimes 
discretionarily grant access to providers that have not obtained the consent of all 
individuals concerned. A case in point is the problematic operation of the 
aforementioned Sesame Credit scoring system offered by a branch of Internet giant 
Alibaba, which operates China’s largest e-commerce platform Taobao. 92  Sesame 
Credit offers credit scoring for tens of millions of Taobao users based on diverse 
sources, including the records held by such government PCI platforms as those of 
Shanghai and Hangzhou.93 The company claims that credit scores will be available to 
Taobao users who subscribe to Sesame Credit services and authorise the company to 
access their personal credit information.94 However, personal credit information on 
every Taobao user is likely to have been collected and processed before any such 
authorisation has been granted, as Sesame Score is readily available to subscribers as 
soon as they accept the service agreement. 95  The so-called ‘retrospective 
authorisation’ obtained by the company is by no means proper authorisation under the 
Shanghai Municipal Provisions on the Collection and Use of Public Credit 
Information and Provisions of Hangzhou City on Public Credit Information . The 
                                                          
89 See SCS Outline, Part IV entitled “Accelerating the Construction and Application of Credit 
Information System”. 
90 See Big Data Outline, Part III, Section 1.2 entitled “Steadily Advancing the Openness of Public Data 
Resources”. 
91 Art. 20, para. 3, Shanghai Rules; Art.22, Hangzhou Rules; Art. 23, para. 3, Wuhan Rules.  
It is noteworthy that no equivalent stipulation is available under the RACII whose approaches to the 
collection and processing of FCI are followed by most local SCI legislation. Article 18 of the RACII 
provides unequivocally that credit information holders should not allow access by the third parties 
which have not obtained consent from information subjects, unless otherwise prescribed by the laws. 
92 See discussion in Part IB of this article. 
93 See Sesame Service Agreements as of 25 December 2015, https://xy.alipay.com/auth/agreement.htm.  
94 Ibid.  
95 See “Sesame Credit Crosses the River by Touching Stones” [芝麻信用“摸石头过河], Caixin Weekly, 
No.7, 2015 (16 February 2015). 
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apparent failure to obtain consent from data subjects in this case adversely affects the 
reliability of the whole system for PCI sharing between the government and private 
market entities, particularly given the massive coverage of Alibaba users and growing 
market influence of Sesame Credit.96  
In addition, the outsourcing of PCI processing may also open the door for further 
circumvention of the requirement to obtain consent from data subjects. In several 
regions, including Shanghai and Shenzhen, it was non-state organisations that 
assumed the role of collecting both FCI and PCI in the 2000s.97  Later, the non-
financial credit system has been separated from the financial credit investigation 
system and integrated into government-owned PCI platforms. Platform operators that 
find themselves short of technological capacity tend to entrust market-based 
organisations with PCI processing and the provision of credit services to PCI users. 
For instance, the Shanghai SC authority has commissioned a leading credit rating 
company to develop comprehensive credit scores for 24 million residents based on 
their PCI. The scoring results are allegedly the largest big data application in the field 
of social credit, and will likely constitute an important component of the Shanghai 
government’s joint punishment scheme.98  Given that the company is concurrently 
offering credit ratings and consulting services to local consumers,99 there is a risk that 
the entrusted PCI may be exploited for the company’s self-enrichment without the 
                                                          
96 Sesame Credit is among the first eight credit service providers which are being considered by the 
Chinese People’s Bank for granting license for financial credit investigation, which means that it can be 
an important role player in combining PCI and FCI services nationwide. See “The Central Bank 
Instructs Eight Entities to Prepare for the Service of Credit Investigation Pertaining to Individuals”, n 
41 above.  
97 See Xiaodong Cao [曹晓冬], “Credit System Construction in Shanghai: From the Perspective of 
Public Administration” [公共管理视角下的上海信用制度建设] (unpublished Master’s Dissertation 
of Shanghai Jiao Tong University, 2010) p. 26, 32-35. 
98 “R&D on Credit Scoring Facilitates Accurate Governance in Shanghai”, n 24 above. 
99 See the company’s “Self-introduction“, http://www.foison-credit.com/foison-
credit/columns?columnId=6&pageSize=15, accessed 15 April 2017. The company also provide  
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knowledge of the data subjects. Unfortunately, no current legislation mentions the 
regulation of PCI outsourcing. 
Proactive Disclosure 
Individuals’ control over PCI is further weakened by the government’s proactive 
disclosure of selected records. Whilst the inter-agency sharing of PCI is aimed 
primarily at enabling government-imposed joint punishments,100 the public disclosure 
of PCI serves as a collaborative disciplinary tool exercised by business entities and 
individuals. The SCS Outline and its implementing measures highlight the publication 
of records on ‘serious discrediting behaviours’ (often labelled as blacklist items) to 
effectuate ‘social discipline’, which places the record subjects under public criticism 
and moral pressure, as well as ‘market discipline’, which includes restrictive measures 
imposed by industry associations and discriminative treatment by business 
operators. 101  The Guidelines on Joint Rewarding and Joint Punishment explicitly 
endorse the reuse of disclosed PCI by third parties, encouraging the inclusion of such 
records in financial credit reports and their analysis in commercial reputation 
rankings.102  
Local PCI legislation regulates ‘open PCI’ differently. Some such legislation 
stipulates that PCI concerning individuals is generally not publicly available, 103 
whereas some permits the SC authorities to define the scope of PCI subject to 
proactive disclosure.104 The Hubei Regulation even provides that all PCI should be 
published unless laws and regulations prescribe otherwise. 105  These divergent 
                                                          
100 Joint punishment of this kind is usually called “administrative/regulatory discipline” in policy 
documents on SCS. 
101 See Part V, Section 1, SCS Outline; Part VI, Sections 2 & 3, Guidelines on Individual Integrity. 
102 Points 11 through 13, 26, Guidelines on Joint Rewarding and Joint Punishment. 
103 Art. 24, Shaanxi Regulation; Art. 21, Wuxi Regulation; Art. 19, Wuhan Rules. 
104 Art. 16, Shanghai Rules; Art. 17, Hangzhou Rules.  
105 Art. 19, Hubei Regulation. 
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approaches reflect the uncertain attitudes amongst agencies towards government 
transparency. 
Open PCI is governed primarily by the 2007 ROGI, which requires government 
agencies to proactively disclose information that ‘involves the vital interests of 
citizens or organizations’ or matters ‘that need to be extensively known or 
participated in by the general public’. 106  ROGI generally exempts information 
concerning privacy from disclosure, but allows agencies to release such information if 
they consider that non-disclosure would exert a major negative impact on the public 
interest.107 Great discretion is thus vested in government agencies. Research shows 
that local agencies tend to deny activists’ access to administrative penalty decisions 
despite the fact that the disclosure of anonymised decisions would enable the public to 
monitor the exercise of administrative power.108 In the SCS context, however, the 
central authorities have undergone a remarkable attitudinal shift, actively mandating 
the publication of administrative penalty decisions that name the individuals being 
penalised.109 That shift is associated with the SCS policy to expose what is considered 
to be ‘serious discrediting behaviour’.  
A similar extensive list of serious discrediting behaviour is provided in all local 
legislation. Yet the disclosure of such behaviours does not serve the same purpose. 
Some of the enumerated behaviours indeed involve the vital interests of citizens, as 
referred to in ROGI, such as ‘activities severely endangering the health and safety of 
the public’ in the areas of food and drug safety, environmental protection, 
                                                          
106 Art. 9, Regulation on Open Government Information [政府信息公开条例] (promulgated by the St. 
Council on April 5, 2007, effective May 1, 2008). 
107 Art. 14, para 4, ROGI. 
108 Yongxi Chen, “Privacy and Freedom of Information in China: Review through the Lens of 
Government Accountability”, Vol. 1 European Data Protection Law Review (2015) 265, 274-275. 
109 These instructions sought to implement the State Council’s calls. See 2015 Key Initiatives of Open 
Government Information [2015年政府信息公开工作要点] (issued by the General Office of the State 
Council on April 3, 2015).  
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construction quality, production safety and fire prevention.110 Some behaviours may 
not directly affect livelihoods, but their disclosure is considered essential for some 
compelling public interest. For instance, the public naming of judgement defaulters is 
acknowledged to be necessary for inhibiting the prevalent circumvention of 
obligations imposed by effective judicial rulings. 111  There is another sweeping 
category of behaviour whose disclosure serves obscure interests, that is, ‘deliberative 
refusals to perform legal obligations and hence seriously jeopardizing the credibility 
of judicial authorities and administrative authorities’.112 All evasions of administrative 
penalty decisions fall within this category. Their indiscriminate disclosure raises 
concerns about disproportionality and fairness. Substantial differences exist in the 
social impacts of such behaviour, as well as in individuals’ faults in engaging in it. 
Subjecting individuals punished on various grounds to the same level of exposure 
does not correspond to the gravity of their contraventions, nor to the normal 
understanding of ‘serious’ discrediting behaviour. The correctness or appropriateness 
of administrative penalties also varies. Administrative decisions may be reached in 
accordance with government-issued rules that are not necessarily consistent with the 
law. Such decisions are inferior to judicial rulings in terms of the openness and 
fairness of the decision-making process, impartiality of the decision-maker and 
rigorousness of the evidential rules. They are also not necessarily final or legally 
                                                          
110 Point 9, Guidelines on Joint Rewarding and Joint Punishment. 
111 Several Provisions on Publishing the Name List of Untrustworthy Personals Subject to Judicial 
Enforcement [最高人民法院关于公布失信被执行人名单信息的若干规定] (promulgated by the 
Supreme People’s Ct. on July 16, 2013, effective Oct. 1, 2013). The Provisions were amended on 16 
January 2017. The name list can be found at the online portal, Open Information of Judgement 
Enforcement in China [中国执行信息公开网]: http://shixin.court.gov.cn/. 
On its necessity, see Jianfu Chen, Chinese Law Context and Transformation (Brill, 2008) 665-666; 
Shouyong Hu [胡守勇], “The Social Effects of the System of Publishing the List of Untrustworthy 
Judgment Defaulters” [公布失信被执行人名单制度的社会效应], Chongqing Social Sciences [重庆
社会科学] No. 9 (2013) p 30-36. 
112 Point 9, Guidelines on Joint Rewarding and Joint Punishment; Part VI, Sections 2, Guidelines on 
Individual Integrity. The records of this category of behavior are also subject to publication under the 
Hubei Regulation (Art. 29) and the draft Shanghai Regulation (Art. 26). 
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binding because their legality can be reviewed by the courts. Accordingly, public trust 
in administrative decisions is weaker than public trust in judgements.  
It is doubtful whether the indiscriminate publication of ‘serious discrediting 
records’, those on administrative penalty decisions in particular, creates positive 
incentives for ‘keeping faith’ or being ‘sincere citizens’. It does, however, raise 
privacy concerns. For example, it enables the profiling of an individual based 
exclusively on sanctions imposed upon him or her by the government, information on 
which used to be scattered and not readily accessible. Legislative attempts to make 
such publication mandatory have indeed been criticised by some mainland lawyers.113 
According to these critics, citizens’ privacy rights are inevitably compromised by the 
publication of certain contraventions occurring in the private domain, including, for 
example, the concealment of disease in contraction of marriage or of infidelity to a 
spouse. 114  Such criticism is broadly consistent with the rationale for introducing 
privacy exceptions to public trials and the publication of judgments. All three Chinese 
laws governing litigation proceedings exempt cases concerning privacy from open 
trial.115 The Supreme People’s Court (SPC) also forbids the online publication of 
‘information concerning privacy’ in rulings on familial disputes and personality rights 
and that of the full names of parties to marriage and succession cases.116 In this regard, 
secrecy in at least some part of family life is protected by the law. However, there is 
                                                          
113 See Arts. 20 & 26 of the Draft Shanghai SCS Regulation. 
114 See “Municipal Congress Holds ‘Mini Hearing’ in the Community for the First Time; When Social 
Credit Meets Privacy” [市人大“微听证会”首次走进社区，当社会信用遇上个人隐私], Wenhui 
News, 30 August 2016; “Shanghai Social Credit Regulation Draft Seeking Public Comments; 12 
Representatives from the Community Airing Their Views” [上海市社会信用条例征求意见，12位代
表各抒己见], Eastern Radio Online [东广新闻网], 30 August 2016, 
http://sh.sina.com.cn/news/m/2016-08-30/detail-ifxvixeq0688442.shtml. 
115 See Art. 183, Criminal Procedure Law (amended 2012); Art. 134, Civil Procedure Law (amended 
2012); Art. 54, Administrative Litigation Law (amended 2015). 
116 Arts. 8 & 10, Provisions on Publishing Judgments onto the Internet by the People’s Courts [最高人
民法院关于人民法院在互联网公布裁判文书的规定] (issued by the Supreme People’s Ct. on July 25, 
2016, effective Oct. 1, 2016). 
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no Chinese legislation defining the content of the right to privacy. According to 
dominant civil law doctrine, as an element of the right to privacy, ‘private information 
protected from disclosure’ refers to information that is irrelevant to the public interest 
or to the interests of other persons. 117  The implication is that information on a 
violation of the law may not amount to ‘private information’ if that violation 
implicates the public interest.118 Furthermore, civil law doctrine does not cover the 
right to privacy against the intrusion of public authorities. In this regard, the scope of 
privacy is far from clear in the public law context, and is hardly an operable defence 
for citizens looking to restrict the proactive release of PCI by the government.  
The only restriction on such disclosure imposed by local legislation is the setting 
of an expiry date for access to all discrediting records: five years after commission of 
the recorded behaviour 119  or five years after generation of the record 120  unless 
otherwise prescribed by the state. Expired records are to be neither disclosed nor used. 
Although this ‘sunset clause’ to the accessibility of PCI arguably reduces the 
perpetuation of negative track records, it affords data subjects no role in, let alone any 
control over, the selection of PCI for disclosure. Furthermore, no local legislation has 
ever sought to regulate the reuse of disclosed PCI by third parties, a perilous omission 
given the strong possibility of an individual’s discreditable past being exploited to his 
                                                          
117 See Xinbao Zhang, Legal Protection of the Right of Privacy (Second Edition) (The Mass Press, 
2004) 6-7; Liming Wang, On Right of Personality (Chinese Remin University Press, 2005) 561-564. 
118 The implication can be found in Wang, note supra, p 563. For doctrinal development until the 
enactment of Tort Liability Law, see Shengping Gao, PRC Tort Liability Law: Issues, Overseas 
Experience, and Cases (Peking University Press, 2010) 648-649. For the judicial understanding of 
privacy in the context of FOI, see Chen, supra note 108, p. 269-270. 
119 Art. 27, Shanghai Rules; Art. 20, Wuhan Rules; Art. 24, Hangzhou Rules; Art. 30, Draft Shanghai 
Regulation. Their inspiration is likely to be the provision on expiry of financial credit record under 
Article 15 of the RACII. 
120 Art.5, Wuhan Rules. 
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or her detriment.121 Prevention of the storage and use of expired records by third 
parties has received little attention to date.  
Overall, local PCI legislation does not allow individuals to exert effective control 
over the collection and use of their personal credit data. It remains to see whether it 
enables individuals to ensure the accuracy of such data. 
ACCESS AND CORRECTION RIGHTS 
Weak Legal Basis for Rights 
A converging trend that has emerged in local legislation is the recognition that 
individuals have certain interests as data subjects. Accordingly, individuals are 
entitled to access their own PCI after providing proof of identity to the authorities 
concerned or to the credit portal operators holding the information.122 Furthermore, 
individuals are permitted to dispute PCI that they deem inaccurate. The authorities 
generating, or credit portal operators holding, the information must then verify its 
accuracy and rectify or delete any erroneous records. 123  PCI legislation closely 
resembles RACII and its implementing measures with respect to the procedures and 
standards for access to and the correction of FCI. Policy makers seem to be extending 
the regulatory approach from FCI to PCI, which is a commendable move. 
Nevertheless, stipulating or implying a channel for access to and the rectification 
of PCI in administrative rules or policy documents does not confer legally enforceable 
                                                          
121 Even the “good records” of individuals may be abused by third parties to seek profits. Alibaba had 
included its users with high Sesame Credit scores into a new social networking platform as an attempt 
to increase Alibaba’s influence in the social networking market. The platform was reported to involve 
indecency and was closed by Alibaba with apology. As mentioned above, Sesame Credit scores are 
generates based on PCI and other factors. See “Aftermath of the Controversy over Alipay’s ‘Circle’: 
Sesame Credit Rethinks the Confines of the Use of Credit Investigation” [支付宝“圈子风波”后续： 
芝麻信用反思征信使用边界], 21st Century Business Herald [21世纪经济报道], 9 December 2016, 
http://news.21so.com/2016/21cbhnews_129/321892.html.  
122 See, for example, Art.16, Shanghai Rule; Art. 23, Wuxi Regulation; Art. 21, Hangzhou Rule. 
123 Arts. 28 through 30, Shanghai Rule; Arts. 31 & 32, Wuxi Regulation; Arts. 26 through 28, 
Hangzhou Rule. 
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rights. Under Chinese public law, judicial remedies are available primarily for 
violations of rights of the person and property rights (right to privacy not included). 
Individuals cannot sue the administrative agencies for activities affecting any other 
rights or interests unless a specific law or regulation so prescribes.124 Thus, in legal 
terms, individuals can enforce their rights to access and rectify their PCI only as far as 
the information concerned is generated or held by a government agency in a 
jurisdiction in which local regulations recognise such rights. To date, only Shaanxi 
Province and two cities in Jiangsu Province, namely, Wuxi and Taizhou,125  have 
adopted local regulations of this kind. The Shanghai Municipal People’s Congress is 
deliberating on a draft regulation which explicitly provides for the right to both access 
and rectification.126 The disparity in the legal enforcement of PCI policies in different 
regions not only causes unfairness in data protection, but also weakens the accuracy 
of a data system that purports to overcome jurisdictional limits on the flow of data.  
Limits Imposed by Personal Archive Regime 
It is noteworthy that the national regulation on freedom of information (FOI) 
have bearing on information rights related to PCI, which also constitutes government 
information. ROGI, which entered into effect in 2008, creates a general right to 
request the disclosure of information held by government agencies, subject to certain 
exemptions. 127  In the absence of specific legislation on personal information 
protection, ROGI further confers a specific right on the subjects of government-held 
personal information. Article 25 of ROGI guarantees individuals access to 
                                                          
124 See Art. 12, [Administrative Litigation Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Apr. 4, 1989, amended Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015).  
125 See Wuxi Regulation (note 122 above), 泰州市公共信用信息条例, (adopted by the Taizhou City 
People’s Congress on July 29, 2016, effective Oct. 1, 2016). 
126 Arts 29 & 31, Shanghai Municipal Social Credit Regulation (Draft) (published for public comments 
on Dec. 31, 2016). See “上海市社会信用条例（草案）.” Shanghai Government Portal, December 31, 
2016. http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/nw2/nw2314/nw2315/nw4411/u21aw1187561.html. 
127 Art. 13, ROGI. 
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‘government information about themselves such as tax and [administrative] fee 
payments, social security and medical care information’ and allows them to request 
the correction of such information if it is not recorded accurately.128 Ambiguity arises, 
however, concerning how far the scope of ‘information about themselves’ extends 
beyond the categories enumerated by the article. Nevertheless, social credit records 
pertaining to social security or the payment of taxes and administrative fees — the 
typical records specified in most local PCI legislation — arguably fall neatly within 
the ambit of this ‘subject access right’.  
Although ROGI appears to provide extra guarantees affording citizens control 
over their own PCI, its utility is reduced by the party-state legacy of ‘personal 
archives’ (个人档案 ), a point that is best illustrated by a judicial review case 
concerning Article 25: Xie v. Education Bureau of Rugao City.129 The plaintiff in the 
case was a primary school teacher who had been dismissed by the education authority 
in 1983 based on allegations that he had violated family planning policies. Resorting 
to ROGI, he requested access to his personal archives, which were held by the 
defendant, to determine the decision-making process leading to his dismissal. The 
defendant refused, citing a provision in the Cadre Archives Regulation of 1991 
stipulating that ‘no one shall be allowed to consult or borrow the personal archives 
about himself or his intermediate relatives’. 130  In upholding the nondisclosure 
decision, the court held that the requested information constituted ‘personal archives’, 
                                                          
128 Art, 25, ROGI. 
129 Xi v. Education Bureau of Rugao City [谢某诉如皋市教育局] (People’s Court of Rugao City, Oct. 
2011). See “Private Teacher Dismissed Decades Ago Sued for Denial of Access to His Personal 
Archives; His Claim Was Rejected” [民办教师早年被除名 要求查阅档案被驳回] (Jiangsu Online 
[中国江苏网], Oct. 11, 2011), http://www.chinanews.com/edu/2011/10-11/3381403.shtml.  
130 Art. 31(5), Cadre Archives Regulation [干部档案工作条例] (adopted by the Organization 
Department of CCP Central Committee & State Archives Administration on April 2, 1991, effective 
April 2, 1991).  
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and thus fell outside the scope of government information prescribed by ROGI.131 In 
fact, however, ROGI defines government information as information made or 
obtained by the administrative agencies in the course of exercising their powers and 
recorded and stored in a given form,132 which obviously covers all government-held 
personal archives. ROGI is at a higher level in the hierarchy of sources of law than the 
Cadre Archives Regulation (which, despite its title, is actually an administrative rule 
issued by a department of the State Council together with a central organ of the ruling 
party), and was enacted more recently. Hence, in the event of any inconsistency 
between the two, ROGI should prevail according to the constitutional principles for 
resolving conflicts amongst legal norms.133 The ruling in Xie obviously misapplied the 
law. Unfortunately, it set the tone, with subsequent cases following suit in blocking 
access to personal archives with reference to the Cadre Archives Regulation.134 
These problematic rulings demonstrate the predicament in which the legal 
protection of personal data finds itself in a political system that prioritises the control 
of personal data considered critical to the party-state. The personal archive regime 
was established in 1956 by the CCP, and primarily covers students and the employees 
of state-run entities. 135  A personal archive is a dossier on an individual that is 
compiled throughout his or her life by the institutions directly supervising him or her 
                                                          
131 See note 129 above. 
132 Art. 2, ROGI. 
133 See Arts 88 & 92, Law on Legislation [立法法] (adopted by Nat'l People's Cong., March 15, 2000, 
amended and effective March 15, 2015). 
134 See for example three recent cases adjudicated respectively in Jiangsu Province, Shandong Province 
and Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region: Chen Xiaohui v. Market Supervision Bureau of Danyang City 
[陈晓辉诉丹阳市市场监督管理局] (Intermediate Court of Zhenjiang City, June 8, 2016); Li Xin v. 
Licheng District Education Bureau of Jinan City [李心公诉济南市历城区教育局] (Shandong 
Provincial High Court, June 12, 2016); Song X v. Human Resource and Social Security Bureau of 
Hangjinhou Banner [宋某等诉杭锦后旗人力资源和社会保障局], (Intermediate Court of 
Bayannao’er City, Sep. 30, 2016). 
135 Education Department of the Ministry of Labor and Personnel [劳动人事部人事教育局] & Anhui 
Provincial Personnel Bureau [安徽省人事局], Management of Personnel Archives [人事档案管理] 
(Beijing: Labor & Personnel Press, 1987) 19-22. 
32 
 
(e.g. his or her schools and/or state-owned employers). It comprises materials 
indicating the most important merits of an individual, such as his or her diplomas and 
degrees, academic transcripts, professional qualifications, work appraisals, political 
affiliations and major political activities, any awards and disciplinary sanctions 
received, and his or her history of employment, promotions, transfers, dismissals and 
retirement.136 As declared in the SPC case comment on Xie, personal archives are not 
merely records of an individual’s life trajectory, but are also closely correlated with 
his or her remuneration, social security benefits and political party membership.137 In 
view of the importance of those archives, the SPC comment argues that the personal 
archive regime represents a significant feature of China’s personnel management 
system, and involves secret matters of the party and state.138 This argument actually 
restates the orthodox CCP principle that personal archives, particularly those 
concerning cadres (e.g. officials of state authorities and party organs), serve as the 
crucial basis upon which the party selects cadres and appraises the merits of 
individuals.139 Such personal information is thus necessarily of a political nature and 
deserving of secrecy.140 For the same reason, the imperative to withhold personal 
archives from their subjects extends to the archives on non-cadres working in state or 
CCP organs and state-run institutions,141 as well as individuals working in the private 
                                                          
136 Art. 10, Cadre Archives Regulation. 
137 The judicial comment is published on the official portal for judicial news, and authored by a staff 
member of the same court that rendered the judgement. See “The Party Concerned Shall Not Have 
Access to His or Her Own Personnel Archives” [当事人不可要求查阅本人人事档案] (China Court 
Online [中国法院网], June 13, 2014) 
http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/06/id/1315016.shtml. 
138 Ibid. In explaining justifications for the ruling, the author adds that personal archives constitute 
“classified information of the Party and the State,” and are hence covered by the exemption of state 
secrets. However, no law or regulation generally identifies personal archives as classified information 
or state secrets. The author’s argument is untenable. 
139 See the description of the nature of personal archives in a textbook compiled by the central authority: 
Management of Personnel Archives (note 135 above) 23-24.  
140 Ibid., 6-7. See also [当代中国的人事管理] (Beijing: Contemporary China Press, 2009) 222-223. 
141 See Art. 17(4), Provisions on Personal Archives of Enterprise Staff [企业职工档案管理工作规定] 
(issued by the Ministry of Labor & State Archives Administration on June 9, 1992).  
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sector.142 All these rules that were issued jointly by the CCP and the state organs 
sustain a party-state regime that governs the most important types of personal 
information and one-sidedly stresses the utility of such information to the ruling party. 
The unfortunate reality, as confirmed by the courts in a variety of FOI cases, is that 
the party-state regime overrides national legislation that purports to protect data 
subjects’ access right and safeguard individuals’ intermediate interests.  
The dominance of the personal archive regime may extend from the FOI context 
to the SCS. There is similarity between personal archives and social credit records: 
both include appraisals of individuals’ performance of their societal roles, particularly 
their compliance with state-sanctioned rules. In fact, the SCS Outline calls for the 
establishment of ‘integrity archives’ for various focal groups, such as civil servants, 
members of the judiciary, experts and agents working in the statistics, advertising and 
environmental impact assessment sectors, and the creation of ‘credit archives’ for all 
citizens in relation to certain types of behaviour, such as online activities and 
violations of traffic codes. 143  The personal information contained in the 
aforementioned integrity archives may well fall within the ambit of ‘personal 
archives’. In particular, the General Office of the State Council advocates for the 
compilation of student honesty archives by universities to include records on 
academic cheating, failure to repay loans and the falsification of materials for job 
applications.144 Such records overlap in full with what is collected in the personal 
archives of university students under the Cadre Archives Regulation. More 
                                                                                                                                                                      
State Archives Administration is concurrently a department of the State Council and a department 
under the CCP Central Committee. In practice, however, its operation, funding and personnel 
management is carried out within the CCP system.  
142 See Art. 14(4), Provisional Provisions on Personal Archives of Persons in Mobility [流动人员人事
档案管理暂行规定] (issued by the Organization Department of the CCP Central Committee & 
Ministry of Personnel on Dec. 18, 1996). 
143 See SCS Outline. 
144 See [国务院办公厅关于加强个人诚信体系建设的指导意见] (issued by the General Office of St. 
Council on Dec. 23, 2016), Part II, Section 4. 
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importantly, part of the rationale for the SCS, i.e. the need to select individuals who 
satisfy certain state-approved standards, fits precisely with the political functions of 
the personal archive regime. Although it is unclear whether the SCS will operate 
independently from the personal archive regime, we should not ignore the impacts of 
the party-state’s secrecy imperatives on the officials who design and operate the SCS, 
which is refreshed system of citizen profiling. Even if more localities adopt legislation 
that recognises the subject access right, the subordination of that legislation to CCP 
rules may reoccur in practice. 
Given the weak legal force of most local PCI legislation and the extra-legal 
restraints on ROGI, the protection of access and correction rights in relation to PCI is 
at a rather primitive stage, although the initiatives undertaken by local pilot schemes 
are broadly consistent with the regulatory trends of big data profiling in some 
pioneering jurisdictions such the EU and US.   
CONCLUSION 
 
Law-making on public credit information at the local level is the first step taken 
by the Chinese state to standardize the practices in constructing the ambitious Social 
Credit System. It deserves close examination for those who are concerned with the 
privacy impact and other profound implications of the SCS, a big data-empowered 
system that is potentially capable of tracking and profiling each individual and rating 
him or her according to state-imposed criteria with legal and social consequences. 
Distinct from the regimes common to most jurisdictions that regulate private bodies’ 
handling of financial credit data, PCI legislation focuses on government agencies and 
adopts a highly fluid concept of credit data. In the absence of general legal framework 
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for personal data protection, it is such legislation that sets the basic albeit interim rules 
for the “jungle of big credit data”.  
However, PCI legislation largely fails to live up to the tenets of personal data 
protection, as demonstrated by the foregoing analysis in this paper.  This regulatory 
approach gives virtually free rein to secondary use of and big data analytics 
concerning records on misbehaviours, including those records that many individuals 
regard as sensitive and should be kept private. Automatic matching of credit data 
databases and profiling about individuals are hence permissible, entailing threats to a 
series of privacy-related interests including rehabilitation, personal autonomy, and 
non-discrimination.  
From a legal perspective, the existing Chinese legislation at both national and 
local levels does not effectively prevent the party-state from expanding and 
intensifying its control over each citizen by generating, aggregating and exploiting 
personal data on their social behaviours. While law-making concerning the SCS may 
evolve, the party-state’s governance strategy is one of the most important factors to 
consider when we try to understand the effectiveness of legislation in mitigating the 
privacy impacts of the SCS. A natural response to the flaws of current PCI legislation 
is to call for substantial revision of existing provisions and making of new and, ideally, 
national law which incorporate the cardinal principles of data protection. For instance, 
the public may demand the law to explicitly grant data subjects’ with a right to access 
and correct their credit data, and a right to object to access and use of credit data by 
third parties. However, if the SCS develops truly according to the blueprint prescribed 
by the SCS Outline and Big Data Outline, there may be growing gaps between the 
system and wishful suggestions on legal reform towards more stringent protection of 
personal data. Throughout the construction of the SCS, tension persists between the 
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statist big data profiling and the societal call for privacy preservation. Our current 
study is meant to be an invitation for follow-up studies of the interaction between the 
law and practices concerning the SCS.  
